Introduction
Two seemingly ad hoc properties of kind-referring NPs have often been mentioned in the literature on generic nominals. One is that definite singular NPs that refer to kinds (in examples like The lion is not yet in danger of extinction) denote a so-called "well-established" kind. This does not hold for all types of kind-referring NPs, though. A second issue that has often been mentioned is that indefinite singular NPs that refer to kinds (in examples like A lion (namely the Berber lion ) is almost extinct) always refer to a subkind of the most general kind of thing their descriptive content is compatible with, which does not hold for all types of kind-referring NPs either.
In this paper, I show how these, and other, discrepancies between different types of kind-referring NPs can be given a perfectly general explanation if one assumes with Gundel, Hedberg, and Zacharski (1993) that an NP form signals a certain cognitive status for its associated discourse referent, regardless of what type of entity this discourse referent is. Gundel, Hedberg, and Zacharski (1993) (hence, GHZ (1993) ) assume that nominal forms (e.g. determiners and pronouns) provide processing signals that assist the addressee in restricting the set of possible interpretations of a nominal phrase. That is, the form of a referring expression provides information about where in the hearer's memory store a representation of the expression's referent is expected to be found. Based on empirical studies in five different languages, they suggest that there are six cognitive statuses that NP forms may be associated with cross-linguistically. This is represented in the Givenness Hierarchy in (1), here with some correlated English forms.
The Givenness Hierarchy
(1) The Givenness Hierarchy: in focus > activated > familiar > uniquely identifiable > referential > type identifiable it that, this, that N the N indefinite a N this N this N Each form encodes (and is therefore located under) the minimum cognitive status that the discourse referent must be assumed to have in the hearer in 1 I am in debt to Greg Carlson, Thorstein Fretheim, Jeanette Gundel, Nancy Hedberg, Michael Hegarty and Ron Zacharski for insightful comments to this paper. In addition, I want to express my special gratitude to Jeanette Gundel. She has been, and is, a very important source of inspiration and knowledge for me linguistically, and a wonderful friend.
In (2a), the phrase the dog next door may be uttered felicitously even if the hearer did not know beforehand that there was a dog next door. In that context, the discourse referent associated with the expression the dog next door in (2a) is not familiar, activated, or in focus. But the descriptive content of the phrase is sufficient to justify the creation of a unique representation of the dog, so the discourse referent is uniquely identifiable, as required. In (2b), the phrase the dog is used in a case where the associated discourse referent is not only uniquely identifiable, but even activated, as the dog has already been mentioned. Thus, (2b) illustrates that the cognitive status that each form is associated with is the minimum cognitive status required by the form; the cognitive status of the associated discourse referent may also be higher. The fact that expressions are typically not used when a higher status than the required one is fulfilled, is assumed to be due to conversational implicatures that result from an interaction of Grice's Maxim of Quantity with the Givenness Hierarchy:
The Maxim of Quantity (Grice, 1975) :
Q1: Make your contribution as informative as required (for the current purpose of the exchange). Q2: Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
From Q1 it is expected that a nominal form is most felicitously used when its associated discourse referent has the exact cognitive status that the form signals, whereas Q2 loosens this requirement, implying that it might not always be required that one is this informative.
One thing that can be argued to follow from Q1 is that if a form is used to refer to an entity with a higher cognitive status than what is strictly speaking required, then the closer cognitive statuses will be preferred, since these are more close to what is encoded, and therefore more informative. This provides an explanation for why the indefinite article, which signals the status 'type identifiable', is quite often used to refer to discourse entities that are referential, whereas it is very seldom used to refer to entities that are uniquely identifiable or more. The same kind of argument can explain the fact that the definite article is used more often to refer to e.g. activated entities than the indefinite article is.
The implicatures that are assumed to arise as an interaction of Grice's Maxim of Quantity with the Givenness Hierarchy, result in a dissociation between cognitive statuses and forms. The indefinite article, for instance, implicates that the associated discourse referent is not uniquely identifiable. Since implicatures (unlike necessary inferences) can be cancelled, or may fail to appear, this dissociation between cognitive statuses and forms only takes form of a tendency, though. That indefinites can be used in some cases even if their associated discourse referent is e.g. activated, is illustrated in (3).
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(3) a. I met a student before class. A student came to see me after class as well -in fact it was the same student I had seen before. b. Dr. Smith told me that exercise helps. Since I heard it from a doctor, I'm inclined to believe it.
Even though only object-referring NPs are explicitly discussed in the GHZ (1993) paper, the theory does not put any restrictions on what type of entity a nominal expression is supposed to refer to in order to be covered by the theory. Thus, the Givenness Hierarchy is expected to be applicable to nominals that refer to events, just as well as individual objects, for instance. That this expectation is borne out has been shown in e.g. Borthen, Gundel, and Fretheim (1997) , Hegarty, Gundel, and Borthen (2001) , and Gundel, Hegarty, and Borthen (2002) for demonstrative and personal pronouns in English and Norwegian. Likewise, there is nothing in the Givenness Hierarchy that suggests that the processing signals provided by a form work differently with kind-referring NPs than with object-referring NPs. On the contrary, assuming that nominal forms are associated with certain cognitive statuses, it is expected that kind-referring and object-referring NPs behave exactly the same in this respect.
3 This is the hypothesis put forth in this paper, and we will see later how this sheds light on what appears to be peculiarities of different types of kind-referring NPs. The distinction between kind-referring and object-referring NPs will be explicated in the next section.
Forms and interpretations of kind-referring NPs

Definition of kind-referring NPs
I assume with Chesterman (1991) , among others, that whether or not an NP is kind-referring depends ultimately and exclusively on what type of ontological entity is being referred to. An NP is kind-referring simply if reference is not made to an individual object, but to a genus, a species, or more generally a kind, which is an abstract entity that captures generalizations about individual objects of a certain type. 4 Some properties are true of kinds rather than individual objects, and the kind-interpretation of an NP is therefore triggered if a predicator requires this NP argument to refer to a kind. This can best be illustrated by some examples.
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(4) a. The potato was first cultivated in South America. b. A cat will become extinct soon. c. Bell invented it.
As Krifka et al. (1995) point out, the subject in (4a) above is kind-referring because reference is made not to some particular potato or group of potatoes, but rather to the kind potato (Solanum tuberosum) itself. The reason why the subject has to have this interpretation is that cultivation is something that applies to species, or kinds, not individual plants or potatoes. As for (4b), the subject phrase can be seen as kind-referring if reference is made to some kind of cat, e.g. the lion. Extinction is something that necessarily applies to species, or kinds, not individual cats, so the subject in (4b) has to be kind-referring. And as for (4c), one invents kinds of things, not individual objects, which means that whatever it in (4c) refers to, it must be a kind of thing. Similar arguments can be provided for the underlined phrases in (5) below, that are all kind-referring in the sense in which the term is used here.
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(5) a. Among the lizards, iguanas are the most popular as a local food.
b. Mary designed the coke bottle. c. Ceila is campaigning about some seals. They are the kinds that are found in Newfoundland and Alaska, and they are dying out at an alarming rate. d. Two whales, namely the blue whale and the fin whale, were put under protection. e. Every whale (from the pygmy whale to the blue whale) is protected by law.
Notice that kind-reference as it is defined here depends ultimately on what type of entity is being referred to, i.e. whether it is an individual object (or a set of individual objects), or an abstract entity, a kind, which generalizes over properties of individual objects. Syntactic realization, the entity's position in a taxonomic hierarchy, and whether the entity is "wellestablished" or not, are not guiding lines.
Differences between different types of kind-referring NPs
The 'well-established kind'-requirement
According to Krifka et al. (1995) , it has been common to assume that some kind-referring NPs must be semantically connected with a so-called "wellestablished kind". This was pointed out by Vendler (1967) , Nunberg and Pan (1975) , Carlson (1977b), and Dahl (1985) for singular NPs with the definite article in English, according to Krifka et al. The 'well-established kind'-requirement can be illustrated by the minimal pairs in (6), where the underlined phrases are all supposed to be kind-referring.
(6) a. The coke bottle has a narrow neck.
b. ??The green bottle has a narrow neck. c. The blue whale is the largest animal on earth. d. ??The big whale is the largest animal on earth. e. Bell invented the telephone. f. ??Bell invented the device.
It will be argued later that examples such as those in (6b), (6d), and (6f) can be perfectly acceptable in certain contexts. Still, there is a difference in immediate acceptability between the minimal pairs in (6), so at this point, we follow the tradition in the literature and mark (6b), (6d), and (6f) with two question marks to indicate their (relative) unacceptability. The difference in acceptability between (6a) and (6b) when the underlined phrase is taken to refer to a kind, is said to be due to the fact that the coke bottle is a well-established kind, whereas the green bottle is not. Likewise, the difference in acceptability between (6c) and (6d) might be argued to be due to the fact that the blue whale is a well-established kind in the sense of being a familiar kind of species, whereas the big whale is not. And whereas the telephone is a well-established kind, the device is too conceptually underspecified to be one, which can explain the relative difference in acceptability between (6e) and (6f).
Whereas sensitivity to being or not being well-established is quite striking for singular kind-referring NPs initiated by the definite article, the same effect does not appear, or does not appear as clearly, for other types of kind-referring nominals. This has also been pointed out in e.g. Krifka et al. (1995) . Recall from the examples above that the phrase the green bottle is standardly regarded as unacceptable when intended to be kind-referring, due to the descriptive content of the phrase, which does not correspond to an already a well-established concept. As shown in (7) below, the very same descriptive content green bottle can perfectly well be used in other types of kind-referring phrases, which means that they can refer to kinds that are not well-established in the sense that is supposed to account for the data in (6).
(7) a. Mary designed a green bottle.
b. Mary designed this green bottle.
For (7b), imagine that different kinds of bottles are lined up and that the interlocutors are discussing who has designed what kinds of bottles. In that context, it is perfectly fine to state (7b) to mean that Mary designed the one already activated kind of bottle that is green. What Mary designed in (7ab) is in both cases a kind of thing. Still, the phrases do not have a descriptive content that is compatible with an already well-established kind, which makes these phrases seemingly different from the corresponding phrase the green bottle in (6b), which is standardly marked as unacceptable. Thus, in (7), we see that the 'well-established kind'-requirement no longer holds when the kind-referring phrase is a singular indefinite, as in (7a), or a singular demonstrative noun phrase.
More examples of the same kind are given in (8) and (9). Recall from (6) that the phrases the device and the big whale were regarded as unacceptable on a kind-interpretation. As we see in (8) and (9), the predicates device and big whale are not generally incompatible with kind-interpretations.
(8) a. Bell invented a device.
b. Bell invented this device.
(9) a. A big whale just became extinct. b. This big whale just became extinct.
As Krifka et al. (1995) point out, these kinds of data question whether the 'well-established kind'-test exemplified by the data in (6) tests for reference to a kind or rather tests for reference to a well-established kind. It will be argued later that Krifka et al.'s question is well-motivated, and that being well-established is neither a general property of kinds, nor a linguistic concept that is relevant for kind-referring NPs initiated by the definite article, as opposed to corresponding object-referring NPs.
The taxonomic readings
Another type of restriction on kind-referring NPs which seems to be sensitive to NP form, is whether or not one has a so-called "taxonomic" interpretation of kind-referring NPs. The presence or absence of taxonomic readings is illustrated in (10).
(10) a. Mary designed the coke bottle.
b. Mary designed a coke bottle. c. Mary designed the coke bottles. d. Mary designed this coke bottle. e. Mary designed it.
In (10a), it is stated that Mary designed the one unique and most general kind fitting the descriptive content of the coke bottle, and nothing is either said or presupposed about the possibility of there being subtypes of the coke bottle. Thus, the direct object in (10a) does not have a taxonomic interpretation. In (10bcd), on the other hand, the most likely interpretations presuppose that there is a taxonomy of coke bottles, and the kind-referring NPs most likely refer to some of the subtypes of the coke bottle rather than the coke bottle -which are taxonomic interpretations. In (10b), with the singular indefinite article a, it is stated that Mary designed at least one subkind of the coke bottle; in (10c), with a plural definite determiner, one likely interpretation is that Mary designed all the subkinds of the coke bottle, and in (10d), with a singular demonstrative determiner, the most natural interpretation is that Mary designed one of the coke bottle's subkinds, and this subtype is supposed to be already activated in the given context. In (10e), whether it refers to the coke bottle or some subkind of it, depends entirely on the interpretation of the phrase's antecedent. In other words, it differs from NP form to NP form whether one has a taxonomic interpretation or not. More examples that illustrate that NP forms differ w.r.t. whether they get a taxonomic interpretation or not, are given in (11) and (12) below. Just like in (10), the kind-referring NPs in (11a) and (12a) do not achieve a taxonomic interpretation, whereas the kind-referring NPs in (11bcd) and (12bcd) most likely do. As in (10), the (e)-sentences are fully underspecified with respect to this issue. (12) a. The blue whale is almost extinct. b. A blue whale is almost extinct. c. The blue whales are almost extinct. d. This blue whale is almost extinct. e. It is almost extinct. Krifka et al. (1995) make a distinction between kind-referring NPs that have a taxonomic interpretation and those that don't. But they don't make any attempt to explain why some NP forms trigger a taxonomic interpretation whereas others don't. Such an attempt will be made in section 2.4 below.
A few comments on proper names
Before we turn to the issue of explaining the data in 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 above, a few comments on proper names is needed.
There is a long philosophical and linguistic tradition for looking at proper names as semantically fundamentally different from other nominal phrases. In standard predicate logic, they are the only nominals that are represented as a constant, for instance, which entails that proper names denote one particular entity. The view adopted here is that proper names are not that fundamentally different from other nominal forms, and that their main property is not that they denote a particular individual. This view has consequences for the understanding of kind-referring NPs, as many kindreferring NPs have traditionally been regarded as proper names (see e.g. Carlson, 1977ab ).
Let's assume that the general procedure for interpreting an NP is the following: The NP has to refer to some entity which is compatible with the phrase's descriptive content and e.g. number and gender specification (if any), and a further cue in the process of finding the intended referent is that a representation of this entity should be located in memory according to the NP's form; i.e., according to what determiner it has (if any), and whether it is a proper name or a pronoun, for instance.
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Assuming that this procedure is the same for all nominal forms, also proper names have a descriptive content which should be satisfied, as well as a certain form that guides the hearer towards the intended interpretation of the phrase. According to Mulkern (1996) , a full proper name like Jeanette Gundel signals the cognitive status 'uniquely identifiable,' just like the definite article the in English, whereas a single name like Jeanette signals the cognitive status 'familiar,' just like the demonstrative determiner that in English. When interpreting an NP like Jeanette Gundel the hearer is therefore supposed to associate a uniquely identifiable referent who is named Jeanette Gundel. This referent may be uniquely identifiable because it is already familiar to the hearer, or because the descriptive content in the phrase is sufficient to justify that there exists one unique referent in the given discourse universe who fits the given description.
The main difference between proper names and other nominals, according to the present view, is that what entities satisfy the descriptive content of a proper name depends entirely on whether or not the entity has been given the name in question, and not on independently observable properties. Thus, whereas you can infer from looking at a person whether this person is a woman or not, you cannot infer from looking at a person whether the person is named Jeanette Gundel or not. We may therefore say that the meaning of a proper name is not transparent. More precisely, the meaning of a proper name is not fully transparent, as we can sometimes infer whether the intended referent of a proper name is a woman or a man, or European or Asian, for instance.
Whereas a common noun usually holds of many individuals, proper names tend to denote a relatively small set of individuals, sometimes just one. There are many more individuals that are women than there are individuals that are named Jeanette Gundel, for instance. This means that in a restricted context, the use of a proper name will often be less ambiguous than the use of a definite description. However, the opposite situation may also appear; compare the two phrases Jeanette Gundel and the present king of Norway, for instance. There may be more than one Jeanette Gundel in the world, but there is only one present king of Norway. Denoting exactly one entity is therefore neither a necessary, nor a sufficient, property of proper names, according to the present view.
To sum up, a proper name is here not regarded as a constituent that denotes one entity, but a description that has been assigned to an individual as a name of this individual, with very little additional semantic content. It typically, but not necessarily, denotes relatively few entities, especially in a restricted context. The proper name form signals the cognitive status 'uniquely identifiable' when it consists of at least a first name and a second name, and the status 'familiar' when it consists of just a single name.
Let us now turn to kind-referring NPs and the question of whether these are proper names. Consider the NP the blue whale in (13a) below. (13b) and (13c) are two possible Norwegian translations of (13a). Is the expression the blue whale in (13a) a proper name on any interpretation? I will argue that it is not.
The phrase the blue whale in (13a) can be used in a transparent way, referring to a whale that is necessarily blue and a whale. When studying a poster with pictures of different kinds of whales, one of them being evidently blue, a speaker may utter (13a) to express her feelings towards the kind of whale that is blue, for instance. Or we can imagine a person looking at different individual whales swimming around in a pool, uttering (13a) to mean that she likes the particular individual that is blue. On either of these senses, the expression the blue whale behaves just like a normal definite and is not a candidate for being regarded as a proper name. Its meaning is fully transparent and the set memberships of the predicates blue and whale are determined in exactly the same way as for normal common nouns and adjectives. When translating any of these NP senses into Norwegian, the phrase has to be represented with the adjective and the noun as separated words, as in (13b). It cannot be expressed as a morphological compound, as in (13c).
The phrase the blue whale in (13a) can also be interpreted in a nontransparent way, though, in the sense that it can refer to a kind of whale or an individual whale that is actually not blue, but still happens to be called blue whale (in Latin, Balaenoptera musculus).
9 For instance, imagine a zoo that has three individual whales in a pool, one blue whale (a specimen of the kind Balaenoptera musculus), one fin whale, and one sperm whale. None of these individual whales are blue. If someone utters (13a) to express his or her feelings towards the specimen of the kind Balaenoptera musculus, the phrase the blue whale is used to refer to an individual, not a kind. The individual that is being referred to has not been assigned the name blue whale or the blue whale individually, and whether or not an individual fits this description depends on observable and fully transparent properties. According to the above definition of proper names, this use of the blue whale is therefore not an instance of a proper name. When translating this non-transparent sense of the blue whale into Norwegian, the adjective and the noun have to form a morphological compound, as in (13c). As compounds with non-transparent meanings are assumed to be stored in the lexicon, this suggests that the Norwegian string blåhval and the English non-transparent correspondence blue whale are lexicalized on the given interpretation, which accounts for the fact that the whale referred to need not be blue.
The most accessible interpretation of the blue whale in (13a) is that the phrase refers to the same entity as does the Latin expression Balaenoptera musculus, namely a certain kind of whale that is grayish and assumed to be the biggest living animal on earth. On this interpretation, the phrase the blue whale is an obvious candidate for being a proper name. Above, we defined a proper name as an almost non-transparent description that has been assigned to an individual as a name of this individual, with little additional semantic contribution except from that. It was furthermore argued to be a kind of NP that is associated with the cognitive status 'familiar' if it is a single name, and 'uniquely identifiable' if it is a full name. One may argue that the kind of whale that is intended as the referent in the present case has once upon the time been given the name the blue whale. Furthermore, as long as the hearer knows the vocabulary of English, the phrase the blue whale refers to a familiar entity, which is the cognitive status that single proper names are associated with. We also noticed that a proper name typically denotes relatively few entities, especially in a restricted context. And when referring to Balaenoptera musculus, the phrase the blue whale denotes one entity. Still, I will not assume that the blue whale is a proper name on the given interpretation.
As for non-transparency, we saw earlier that the non-transparency of the blue whale is not connected to kind-reference as such, as blue whale may be non-transparent also when it is intended to refer to an individual. On an individual-interpretation, the string is clearly not a proper name, so nontransparency is not something that enforces a proper name interpretation; it may just mean that the string is lexicalized.
With respect to cognitive status, the blue whale refers to a familiar entity, which is compatible with a proper name interpretation. But it is not the case that only one form can signal a certain cognitive status. In other words, kind-referring NPs of the form the N may very well signal the status 'familiar' (or 'uniquely identifiable') without being proper names.
10
As for the restricted set of potential referents, denotation of one entity is neither a necessary, nor a sufficient, property of proper names, according to the present view. Thus, the fact that the blue whale denotes one particular entity on a certain interpretation, is not a compelling argument that it is a proper name either.
One may argue that the kind of whale that is intended as the referent in the present case has once upon the time been given the name the blue whale. However, an alternative non-proper-name interpretation is also possible, as the predicate blue whale has once upon the time been given as a description of any entity that satisfies the (lexically specified) meaning of this complex predicate. On the present definition of proper names, this is not an instance of naming in the proper name sense, as whether or not an entity satisfies the description depends on observable properties of the entity.
Furthermore, if one assumes that the blue whale is a proper name, one needs to somehow relate this assumed proper name interpretation of the blue whale to other kind-referring NPs involving the same predicates that are clearly not proper names, such as a blue whale. Although this is not impossible, 11 it seems that any analysis that allows for either a proper name interpretation or for non-proper name interpretations of blue whale will need to involve either additional lexical stipulations or else some kind of 10 We will see in section 2.4 that kind-referring NPs of the form the N need not refer to familiar entities, as they can also refer to just uniquely identifiable entities. So the cognitive status associated with kind-referring NPs of the form the N will be argued to be 'uniquely identifiable', just as for individual-referring NPs of the form the N. 11 Carlson (1977ab) assumes that all common nouns correspond to proper names of kinds, and that there exists a process that takes proper names of kinds into individual entities of this kind.
processes that convert one interpretation into an other. Other things being equal, it would be preferable to avoid such complications of the grammar. I will therefore assume an alternative analysis.
On this analysis, all (or most) nouns are in principle compatible with both kind-interpretations and individual-interpretations.
12 As for transparency vs. non-transparency, blue and whale in (13a) are listed as separate lexical items in the lexicon, accounting for the transparent interpretations, but blue whale is also listed in the lexicon as a string with an idiosyncratic interpretation, not entailing a blue individual. This non-transparent meaning of blue whale may arise with any kind of determiner, generating both a blue whale and the blue whale, for instance, both possibly acting as kindreferring or individual-referring phrases. Whether the non-transparent meaning of blue whale involves a kind or an individual is mainly determined by the sentence predicate (i.e. whether it is a kind-predicate or not). The required cognitive status of the discourse referent associated with the blue whale in (13a) is imposed by the definite determiner, which signals the status 'uniquely identifiable,' which happens to be the same status as for full proper names 13 . This means that the referent is either already familiar to the hearer (as in the case with kind-referring the blue whale), or the hearer ought to be able to create a unique referent just based on the descriptive content in the phrase.
14 Accidentally, there happens to exist one kind that is familiar to most people and that satisfies the description blue whale, namely Balaenoptera musculus. This interpretation is therefore the one that is most easily available in a non-restricted context if the sentence predicate allows for a kind-interpretation of the blue whale. In more restricted contexts, other interpretations might arise.
The bottom line of this section is that whereas it is quite common in the literature to assume that expressions like the blue whale can function as proper names of kinds, the view is different in this paper. On the present approach, the so-called proper name interpretation of the blue whale is composed from the meaning of the and blue whale in a perfectly compositional fashion, without involving any notion of proper names.
Explanations
In section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 we saw that some, but not all, kind-referring NPs seem to be associated with something like a 'well-established kind'-requirement, and that some, but not all, get a taxonomic interpretation. One solution to these data is to assume that kind-referring NPs have to be divided into subclasses, depending on whether or not they have to refer to well-established kinds and whether or not they are interpreted as subtypes in a taxonomic hierarchy.
As such an approach lacks general explanatory force, I will propose an alternative analysis by relating the use of kind-referring NPs to the general account of the meaning of NP forms proposed by GHZ (1993) .
Let us look at the kind-referring NPs in (14) THE BIG WHALE: A kind-referring NP has to refer to some kind or other compatible with the phrase's descriptive content. As the kind-referring phrase the big whale contains the predicates big and whale, that are not listed in the lexicon as a string with an idiosyncratic meaning, this means that the intended referent is some kind or other which is big and a whale. In addition, the referent has to be such that the associated discourse referent satisfies the requirements imposed by the determiner used in the phrase, as described by the association between forms and cognitive statuses in the Givenness Hierarchy. The definite determiner the is connected with the cognitive status 'uniquely identifiable.' This means that the hearer is supposed to be able to uniquely identify the intended discourse referent based on the phrase's descriptive content alone, either because the hearer is already familiar with it, or because the hearer can create a unique representation based on the descriptive content. It might be hard to come up with a context where this requirement is immediately satisfied for the big whale. The reason is that there is in general no familiar kind in people's memory corresponding to this concept (unless we assume a more specific context), nor is it possible to construct a new unique representation of the referent just based on the descriptive content in the phrase, as there are several big whales. However, the kind-referring expression the big whale may be felicitous in certain contexts. For instance, let us assume that we are looking at a chart featuring pictures of whales, each representing a species, and one of them is obviously larger than the others. Then, it is perfectly felicitous to utter The big whale is almost extinct to mean that the associated species is almost extinct. 15 The subject phrase is then valid because the hearer can retrieve a unique representation of the referent, as it has already been (visually) activated. Notice that if the descriptive content is richer, as with the big baleen whale that lives in the North Sea, the phrase may be acceptable even if the kind referred to is neither previously activated, nor familiar. This is so because the rich descriptive content big baleen whale that lives in the North Sea justifies the presupposition that the kind can be uniquely identified just based on the descriptive content. The notion of being 'well-established' is a bit vague in the existing literature, but it seems reasonable to assume that well-established means familiar in the sense of GHZ (1993) . Given that this is a valid assumption, this example shows that one cannot assume that kindreferring NPs initiated by the definite article are always associated with the so-called 'well-established kind'-requirement. As shown above, the associated discourse referent of the big baleen whale that lives in the North Sea need not be already familiar to the hearer for the phrase to be valid. THE BLUE WHALE: Regardless of whether this phrase is used in a nontransparent manner or as a fully compositional NP with a transparent interpretation, the definite article the is associated with the cognitive status 'uniquely identifiable,' according to GHZ (1993) . As there happens to exist exactly one familiar (and therefore uniquely identifiable) kind corresponding to the lexically listed description blue whale, namely the kind the reader now know as Balaenoptera musculus, this requirement can be fulfilled without any particular contextual preconditions. If the phrase is used in the transparent fashion, reference may be made to any kind of blue whale that is uniquely identifiable to the hearer. Since there are possibly many whales that are blue, we then need a more specific context which establishes one unique blue whale in order to accept the expression as felicitous (see the suggested contexts for the big whale above).
Even though "well-establishedness", or familiarity in GHZ's terms, is the most natural context for acceptance of the expression the blue whale, this does not mean that familiarity has to be stated as a linguistically relevant primitive for this type of expressions. The solution proposed here is to assume that like any other nominals headed by the definite article, kindreferring NPs initiated by the definite article (be it used in a transparent manner or not) are required to have an associated discourse referent which is uniquely identifiable. Being well-established, or familiar, just happens to be the subcase of being uniquely identifiable that is the most easily available context to justify the use of the definite article for these types of kindreferring NPs. Thus, the relative difference in acceptability between the blue whale and the big whale, illustrated in (6ab), is primarily due to the fact that it is much more easy to create or imagine a context in which a kind satisfying the descriptive content blue whale can be uniquely identified than it is to imagine a context in which a kind satisfying the descriptive content big whale can be uniquely identified. This is again correlated to the fact that the string blue whale has a lexically specified meaning which in itself narrows down the set of possible referents in a way that compositionally derived big whale does not.
A BLUE/BIG WHALE: On its transparent interpretation, the kind-referring phrase a blue whale is supposed to refer to some kind or other which is blue and a whale. On its non-transparent interpretation, it is supposed to refer to some kind or other which satisfies the lexically specified meaning of the string blue whale. The indefinite article signals the cognitive status 'type identifiable' in the Givenness Hierarchy, which means that the hearer can at least identify the type of thing referred to. According to an implicature associated with the indefinite article, the hearer can most likely not uniquely identify it. As there happens to exist one uniquely identifiable kind which satisfies the descriptive content blue whale, namely Balaenoptera musculus, this means that reference is most likely not made to this entity. So, what possibilities are there to refer to some not uniquely identifiable kind which should be blue and a whale, or alternatively satisfying the idiosyncratic meaning of blue whale? Well, if one assumes that there are subtypes of the blue whale, and that the expression a blue whale refers to one of these, the requirements and implicatures of the indefinite article are met, at the same time as the referent is compatible with the descriptive content of the phrase. This is how the 'taxonomic' interpretation of singular, kind-referring indefinites comes about. On its transparent interpretation, a blue whale may simply refer to some whale or other which is blue, and the same holds for a big whale, except that the whale ought to be big. THE BIG/BLUE WHALES: According to the descriptive content and the number specification of the phrase the big whales, reference is made to a set of kinds that are big and whales. The definite determiner encodes the cognitive status 'uniquely identifiable' according to the correlation between nominal forms and cognitive statuses in the Givenness Hierarchy. Since the referent is plural, reference to singular entities is excluded. Thus, the expression the blue whales cannot refer to Balaenoptera musculus, for instance. 16 In order to get access to a set of kinds satisfying the descriptive content big whale, the obvious solution is to move down in a presupposed taxonomic hierarchy of whales, licensing a taxonomic interpretation. The uniqueness requirement imposed by the determiner is fulfilled without any particular requirements on the context, since there happens to exist exactly one unique set of big whales regardless of context, namely all big whales. In contrast, the singular expression the big whale is less likely to be used if the 16 Some may argue that kind-referring the Ns can refer to the kind N, just like kind-referring the N. I will argue with Burton-Roberts (1976), Quirk et al. (1985) , and Chesterman (1991) b. The Sumerians invented the pottery wheel/?the pottery wheels. The only way to make the plural objects in (iab) felicitous is to assume that there are different types of transistors and pottery wheels, and that Shockley invented a plurality of transistors and that the Sumerians invented a plurality of pottery wheels. So apparently, the referents of the transistors and the pottery wheels have to be plural. referent is not previously activated, as it is not the case that there exists one generally uniquely identifiable big whale.
THIS BIG/BLUE WHALE: According to the correlation between English forms and cognitive statuses in the Givenness Hierarchy, the definite demonstrative determiner this in this big whale signals that the associated discourse referent has the attention state 'activated,' which means that it is either recently mentioned in the previous discourse or otherwise nonlinguistically activated. 17 In other words, this form points to a context where the interlocutors have already been discussing some big whale or other, for instance Balaenoptera musculus. And if some big whale has already been introduced, and therefore is activated, then the kind-referring NP this big whale is fine. The reason why kind-referring this big whale is immediately more easily acceptable than kind-referring the big whale (illustrated by the contrast between (6d) and (9b) above) is that the is compatible with the possibility that the associated referent is supposed to be uniquely identified merely by virtue of the phrase's descriptive content, which is not possible in this case, as there are several big whales. As argued above, also kindreferring the big whale is acceptable if one imagines a context where some big whale has been introduced in the previous discourse, but this type of context is less accessible with the than this, since this is more restrictive, pointing directly to the kind of context which is needed.
Whereas this big whale does not have a non-transparent interpretation (because there is no idiomatic interpretation listed in the lexicon for the string big whale) the expression this blue whale can in principle also be used in a non-transparent way. For instance, if the interlocutors have been discussing the blue whale for hours and how to best protect it from extinction, one tired interlocutor might exclaim I am completely fed up with this blue whale!, intending to refer to Balaenoptera musculus.
IT: This unaccented personal pronoun encodes the attention state 'in focus' in the Givenness Hierarchy, which means that the referent is supposed to be in current center of attention. This is a type of expression for which it does not make sense to discuss whether or not it corresponds to a well-established kind in and of itself (regardless of context). The kind it refers to will necessarily be familiar, as any referent in focus of attention is also activated, familiar, uniquely identifiable and so on. Whether or not the expression refers to a kind high up or far down in a taxonomic hierarchy, is solely dependent on its antecedent, or the non-linguistic context, if it is used deictically.
Section summary
17 GHZ (1993) assume that there is an indefinite this as well as a definite this. Whereas definite this signals the cognitive status Activated, indefinite this just signals the status Referential. This latter this is not considered above, but (14d) could also be used in that sense.
In this section we have related GHZ's (1993) theory on the meaning of NP forms with the assumption that any NP in principle can be kind-referring. Through the predictions of GHZ's theory and perfectly general pragmatic reasoning, we have provided explanations for why some, but not all, kindreferring NPs seem to be associated with a 'well-established kind'-requirement, and why some, but not all, get a so-called taxonomic interpretation.
A kind-referring NP has to refer to some kind or other which fits the descriptive content in the phrase and its number specification (among other features). Whether this kind has to be well-established or not (i.e. familiar or not), depends on the nominal form, and whether this requirement is satisfied will differ from context to context in accordance with the predictions of the Givenness Hierarchy (GHZ (1993)). For instance, the use of an indefinite article will put no 'well-establishedness'-requirement on the phrase, as indefinite determiners, being associated with an implicature that the associated discourse referent is not uniquely identifiable, do not signal familiarity of the associated discourse referent. The use of a definite article, on the other hand, requires that the referent be at least uniquely identifiable, which is a condition that is satisfied if the referent is well-established, or familiar. Notably, there is no requirement that the associated discourse referent is familiar; it just needs to be uniquely identifiable. Differently from a theory that assumes a 'well-established kind'-requirement for kindreferring definites, this predicts that a phrase like the big whale -that does not refer to a kind that is generally familiar to people -can be acceptable if one creates the right kind of context or enriches the phrase's descriptive content. So, on the present approach, all the examples in (6) are perfectly grammatical and semantically felicitous. The reason why the examples in (6b), (6d), and (6f), involving the kind-referring phrases the green bottle, the device, and the big whale appear as less acceptable than the corresponding examples in (6a), (6c) and (6e), with the kind-referring phrases the coke bottle, the telephone, and the blue whale, is due to increased processing efforts involved in imagining appropriate contexts. This difference in turn has to do with the fact that the latter expressions correspond to concepts of kinds that happen to be likely to appear as arguments of kind-predicates, whereas the prior expressions don't.
18 Some of the latter expressions are also listed in the lexicon with a non-transparent meaning. This restricts the set of possible referent candidates for these phrases, which makes the process of finding the intended referents less context-sensitive. Thus, on the present approach, kind-referring nominals initiated by the definite article do not have to refer to a well-established kind; this case just happens to be the subcase of being uniquely identifiable that is most easy to imagine for the reader or hearer if a more specific context has not been presented.
The taxonomic interpretations come about if the form or content of the NP suggests that one does not have reference to the uppermost available kind that satisfies the descriptive content in the phrase. This may be so if the associated referent is not supposed to be uniquely identifiable, whereas the uppermost kind happens to be, or because the intended referent is supposed to be plural, whereas the uppermost available kind is singular. One likely way to satisfy the requirements imposed by the descriptive content and the nominal form in such a phrase is to move down in a presupposed taxonomic hierarchy and assume that reference is made to one or more subkinds of the most highly available kind. This explains the otherwise surprising fact that the definite article of plural nominals patterns with indefinite determiners in that it triggers a taxonomic interpretation when the phrase is kind-referring.
The bottom line of this section is that there is no need to assume that different types of kind-referring NPs are idiosyncratically associated with something like a 'well-established kind'-requirement or a taxonomic or nontaxonomic interpretation. Rather, the different interpretations and requirements associated with different types of kind-referring NPs can be seen as following from perfectly general properties of nominals, and most importantly from the correspondence between nominal forms and cognitive statuses as proposed by GHZ (1993).
Discussion: generic bare plurals and a-expressions
GHZ's predictions
Two types of NPs have deliberately been left out of the discussion so far, namely generic bare plurals and generic NPs initiated by the indefinite article. The reason why these types of expressions have been left out so far is that they represent particular challenges with respect to whether or not they can be kind-referring, and if so, what kind-interpretations they allow for. This challenge is reflected in the long-standing discussion on the topic (see e.g. Carlson (1977ab) , Carlson and Pelletier (1995) , and Chierchia (1998), as well as works cited therein).
According to GHZ (1993) , indefinites encode the cognitive status 'type identifiable,' and they are associated with an implicature which (as an effect) says that the associated discourse referent is not uniquely identifiable. So far in this paper an expression of the form a N has therefore been assumed to refer to a subtype of what kind-referring the N refers to, and correspondingly, a kind-referring expression of the form Ns has been expected to refer to some subkinds of the kind N. These readings are exemplified in (15) below.
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(15) a. A rat was (just) reaching Australia in 1770.
b. Rats were (just) reaching Australia in 1770.
(15a) has an interpretation which says that one kind of rat was reaching Australia in 1770, and (15b) has an interpretation which says that a plurality of rats (i.e. more than one kind of rat) were reaching Australia in 1770.
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A problematic aspect of generic indefinites is that they sometimes seem to be equivalent to definite kind-referring NPs. Consider the data in (16), where (16c) is intended to be kind-referring. Intuitively, the meaning of (16a) and (16b) are very close to the meaning of (16c), which says that the horse has four legs. Since the subject in (16c) is kind-referring, the data in (16) may be taken to indicate that expressions of the type Ns and a N can refer to the kind N, just like the N. On the other hand, one may argue that the subjects in (16ab) are referring to sets of entities that just happen to be more or less equivalent with the kindinterpretation of the subject in (16c) (see Krifka et al. (1995) ).
If a horse and horses in (16) refer to the kind known as the horse, then we have two cases where indefinite NPs refer to uniquely identifiable referents. According to the theory of GHZ (1993) , this means that the implicature usually associated with indefinites (leading to the taxonomic interpretations above) is cancelled, or rather does not arise. Assuming that an interpretation of an indefinite without this implicature typically means more processing effort (because the hearer is not as informative as she should have been) it is predicted that the forms a N and Ns are not as plausible candidates for referring to the kind N as the N is. In other words, given that kind-referring NPs behave exactly like object-referring NPs, the theory of GHZ predicts that the forms a N and Ns may refer to the kind N, but only as an exceptional case, as illustrated for object-referring NPs in (3) in section 1. The question is whether the indefinites in (16ab) are exceptional in that they refer to kinds that are uniquely identifiable, or rather are examples of semantically indefinite generic NPs, in which case reference is made to entities that are not uniquely identifiable. Other things being equal, the most plausible alternative according to GHZ's theory seems to me to be that indefinites of the kind illustrated in (16) are not generally capable of referring to the uniquely identifiable kind that their descriptive content is compatible with. Cases where indefinites refer to uniquely identifiable referents are expected to be relatively marked, whereas the kinds of examples seen in (16) don't stand out as marked in any sense. And whereas GHZ (1993) did not find any examples where (individual-referring) NPs initiated by the indefinite article referred to uniquely identifiable discourse referents in their corpus study, it should be possible to find numerous attested examples of the sort in (16ab).
In sum, if one assumes that the indefinites in (16ab) refer to uniquely identifiable kinds, the examples do not seem as exceptional as one would expect according to the theory of GHZ (1993) . But at the same time, there is nothing in the theory that excludes the possibility that these phrases refer to uniquely identifiable kinds.
More data
As the theory of GHZ provides no conclusive answer as to whether the indefinites in (16) can refer to uniquely identifiable kinds, a few more data might be useful, in order to move a bit closer towards a conclusion. First, consider the data in (17).
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(17) a. The madrigal is popular.
b. ?A madrigal is popular.
Whereas (17a) is perfectly fine, (17b) sounds strange, or somehow less true than (17a). If we assume that the two subjects both refer to the madrigal, this difference in acceptability is not expected. Next, consider the sentences in (18), and compare them to the sentences in (16), which are all perfectly fine. The only difference between the sentences in (16) and those in (18) is that the ones in (18) For the indefinite subjects in (16/18a) and (16/18b), the presence or absence of an adjective only imposes the differences in meaning that one would expect. For the definite NP in (16/18c), on the other hand, the presence of an adjective leads to a less acceptable sentence. That is, (18c) might be perfectly fine in certain contexts, but it is considerably more difficult to find an appropriate context for (18c) than it is to find an appropriate context for 21 According to Krifka et al. (1995) , the kind of data exemplified in (17) has been noted already by Goodman (1955) , and later by e.g. Lawler (1973ab) , Dahl (1975), and Burton-Roberts (1977) .
(16c). Again, if the three subjects in (16) mean the same, why does the insertion of an adjective in (18) make the definite NP less acceptable, while the indefinite ones remain fine? If the subjects in (16) mean the same, the sentences they are part of should also be equivalent when an adverbial is inserted, as in (19) Whereas (19ab) are perfectly fine, the sentence in (19c), with a kindreferring definite, only has an awkward interpretation where the definition of the horse varies over time.
If we take the relative difference in meaning and acceptability between the minimal pairs in (17)-(19) seriously, the most reasonable conclusion is that generic a N and Ns do not have exactly the same meaning as kindreferring the N. One way to then account for the data in (17)- (19) is to assume that the indefinite NPs in (17ab)-(19ab) are generically referring to not uniquely identifiable entities, possibly individual objects. This would then be compatible with the fact that the examples differ in acceptability and interpretation (see e.g. Krifka et al. (1995) ). This assumption is furthermore in accordance with the predictions of GHZ (1993) (see above). And finally, an assumption that the bare plurals in (16b)-(19b) refer to a plurality of entities, and not a singular kind, is less problematic than the alternative solution, since individual-referring phrases of the form Ns can only refer to a plurality of entities.
Notice that the sentential predicates in (16)-(19) can be true either of kinds or individual objects, which opens for the possibility that the arguments at focus are either kind-referring or object-referring. Now, let us consider bare plurals and singular indefinites in sentences where the sentential predicates can only hold of kinds, which excludes object-referring interpretations: In these examples, a N clearly can not be interpreted as referring to the kind N. For instance, (20b), Shockley invented a transistor, certainly does not mean that Shockley invented the transistor. The bare plurals in these examples are more questionable, though. The bare plurals in (20)- (22) can have the taxonomic interpretation, referring to (presupposed) subtypes of the transistor in (20c), to (presupposed) subtypes of the pottery wheel in (21c), and (presupposed) subtypes of the dodo in (22c). But do the bare plurals also have the definite kind-interpretation illustrated by the aexamples? Does (20c), Shockley invented transistors, mean that Shockley invented the transistor? Intuitions are dubious at this point, but e.g. Krifka et al. (1995) conclude that these two sentences do not have the same meaning. That is, they assume that the expressions transistors, pottery wheels, and dodos in (20)- (22) above do not refer to the transistor, the pottery wheel, and the dodo, respectively. As argued above, this conclusion is also the most likely one seen in the light of the theory of GHZ (1993), the reason being that indefinites usually do not refer to uniquely identifiable referents. In addition, this conclusion is what one expects from the number specification of the nominals transistors, pottery wheels, and dodos, and it is the conclusion that is most in accordance with the fact that there are contrasts in meaning and acceptability among the examples in (17)-(22). In other words, this and the previous section suggest that the indefinites in (16)-(22) do not refer to uniquely identifiable kinds. However, the plausibility and validity of this suggestion can only be determined after considering what the exact alternative analysis of the indefinites might be, which is beyond the scope of this article.
Cases where indefinites do refer to Uniquely identifiable kinds
We concluded that the indefinites in (16)-(22) most likely do not refer to uniquely identifiable kinds, but (23a) below is an example where an indefinite clearly can refer to a uniquely identifiable kind.
(23) a. A big, blue baleen whale which lives in the South Pacific, is now almost extinct. b. The big, blue baleen whale which lives in the South Pacific, is now almost extinct.
Intuitively, the subject in (23a) can be used to refer to a uniquely identifiable big, blue baleen whale which lives in the South Pacific. One fact that supports this intuition is that the phrase can just as well be substituted with a corresponding definite phrase without any substantial change in meaning, as illustrated in (23b). Such a substitution was possible in (16) as well, but there the conclusion was that the indefinites still did not refer to uniquely identifiable kinds. The reason why I want to conclude differently in (23) is that the two sentences in (23) do not show internal contrasts w.r.t. acceptability when being modified, whereas the three sentences in (16) did. That is, the subjects in (23) do not contrast with each other w.r.t. acceptability depending on the sentential predicate that is being used, and insertion or substitution of adjectives and adverbials do not lead to internal differences in acceptability. This is illustrated in (24)- (26) The fact that the minimal pairs in (24)- (26) are equally well-formed or illformed makes the sentences in (23) different from those in (16), and supports the assumption that the indefinite in (23a) can be used to refer to a uniquely identifiable kind. This conclusion goes against the claim put forth by e.g. Krifka et al. (1995) , who conclude that expressions of the form a N can never refer the kind N.
The assumption that the subject in (23a) can be used to refer to the same individual as the one in (23b) means that the implicature associated with indefinites, which says that they don't refer to uniquely identifiable referents, doesn't always go through (just as predicted by GHZ (1993)). As for why the indefinite in (23a) can refer to a uniquely identifiable discourse referent, whereas the indefinites in (16)-(22) cannot, this presumably has to do with differences in descriptive content. The implicature that indefinites do not refer to uniquely identifiable referents is assumed to result from an interaction of the Givenness Hierarchy and Grice's maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975) : Q1: Make your contribution as informative as required (for the current purpose of the exchange). Q2: Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. From the first part of this maxim it follows that the most felicitous expressions are those that signal the exact cognitive status that the associated discourse referent has. However, the second part of the maxim says that one should not be more informative than necessary. In (23a), the descriptive content in the subject phrase is so rich that it seems reasonable that it is not necessary to use the most informative nominal form in order to enable the hearer to detect the intended referent. In the indefinite phrases in (17)- (22), on the other hand, the descriptive content is intuitively too poor to make the use of the most informative determiner more informative than required.
In other words, there are some cases where indefinites can refer to uniquely identifiable kinds, but these cases are relatively infrequent and not a systematic pattern associated with generic indefinites.
Section summary
The question of whether generic bare plurals of the form Ns and quasiuniversal a-expressions of the form a N can refer to the kind N, is a nontrivial matter. As earlier observed, these NPs can sometimes appear in the same position as kind-referring definites with what appears to be the same meaning. On the other hand, bare plurals and quasi-universal a-expressions cannot always appear felicitously in the same position as kind-referring definites in English, which suggests that their meaning is not exactly the same.
The analysis of how generic indefinites relate to definite kind-referring NPs involves a number of considerations that have not considered here. But the present discussion has shown that according to the theory of GHZ (1993) , generic indefinites of the form Ns and a N are not expected to be systematically able to refer to the kind N. This conclusion is in line with the fact that generic indefinites cannot always be substituted with kind-referring definites.
Summary
A kind is here defined as an abstract entity which captures generalizations about individual objects of a certain type, and kind-reference is any reference to such an abstract entity.
Given this, this paper has supported the view of Chesterman (1991) that any type of NP can be used to refer to kinds just as well as individual objects. 23 What interpretation is achieved is dependent on whether the sentential predicate selects for a kind or an individual as its argument.
It is not the case that all the forms a whale, whales, the whale, the whales, this whale, and it, for instance, are equally likely to refer to the whale, seen as a kind. All that is implied is that the kind or kinds referred to fit the descriptive content whale and the phrase's number specification (as well as gender specification etc.). Furthermore, the form of the phrase (i.e. whether it is a pronoun or not, or what the type of determiner it has) gives a signal about the cognitive status of the associated discourse referent, in the sense of GHZ (1993) , regardless of whether it corresponds to an individual object or a kind. The signaled cognitive status has consequences for whether the referent is likely to be well-established (i.e. familiar) or not, and whether or not a so-called taxonomic interpretation arises. This, in turn, explains why there is a difference between the distribution and meaning of indefinite and definite kind-referring NPs, between singular definite kind-referring NPs and plural ones, and between kind-referring NPs initiated by the definite article, and kind-referring NPs initiated by a demonstrative determiner, for instance.
In sum, this paper has suggested that the theory on the meaning of NP forms proposed by Gundel, Hedberg, and Zacharski (1993) can successfully be applied to kind-referring NPs as well as object-referring NPs. This application is not only possible and plausible; it even sheds light on data having to do with kind-referring NPs that have so far not been given an explicit and holistic explanation.
